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Abstract: Anonymous VoIP calls over the Internet
holds great significance for privacy-conscious users,
whistle-blowers and political activists alike. Prior re-
search deems popular anonymization systems like Tor
unsuitable for providing requisite performance guaran-
tees that real-time applications like VoIP need. Their
claims are backed by studies that may no longer be valid
due to constant advancements in Tor. Moreover, we be-
lieve that these studies lacked the requisite diversity and
comprehensiveness. Thus, conclusions from these stud-
ies, led them to propose novel and tailored solutions.
However, no such system is available for immediate use.
Additionally, operating such new systems would incur
significant costs for recruiting users and volunteered re-
lays, to provide the necessary anonymity guarantees.
It thus becomes imperative that the exact performance
of VoIP over Tor be quantified and analyzed, so that
the potential performance bottlenecks can be amended.
The impact of interplay of the network performance at-
tributes (e.g., RTT, bandwidth, etc.) on the perceived
call quality thus also needs a fresh look to have a better
understanding. We thus conducted an extensive empir-
ical study across various in-lab and real world scenarios
to shed light on VoIP performance over Tor. In over
0.5 million measurements spanning 12 months, across
seven countries and covering about 6650 Tor relays, we
observed that Tor supports good voice quality (Percep-
tual Evaluation of Speech Quality (PESQ) >3 and one-
way delay <400ms) in more than 85% of cases. Further
analysis indicates that in general for most Tor relays,
the contentions due to cross-traffic were low enough to
support VoIP calls, that are anyways transmitted at
low rates (<120 Kbps). Our findings are supported by
concordant measurements using iperf that show more
than the adequate available bandwidth for most cases.
Data published by the Tor Metrics also corroborates the
same. Hence, unlike prior efforts, our research reveals
that Tor is suitable for supporting anonymous VoIP
calls.
1 Introduction
Voice-over-IP (VoIP) applications that support traffic
encryption are popular among users who are concerned
about their communication privacy. However, these ap-
plications do not safeguard the anonymity for Internet
users residing in regimes, which may conduct surveil-
lance (e.g., the ability of NSA to intercept conversa-
tions is widely known [3, 4, 12]). Moreover, there does
not exist any functional VoIP based system that ensures
communication privacy and anonymity (along with real-
time communication guarantees) required by privacy
conscious Internet users, whistle-blowers etc.
Popular privacy and anonymity preserving systems
like Tor [9] hide the actual IP address of the com-
munication peers by routing their traffic via a cascade
of proxies. Since such systems reroute traffic via cir-
cuitous paths, it is a widely held belief that they would
incur intolerable delays for real-time applications like
VoIP. More importantly, while traditionally VoIP re-
lies on UDP traffic to ensure real-time guarantees, pop-
ular systems like Tor are designed to transport TCP
traffic. Further, complex cryptographic handshakes, es-
sential to the anonymity guarantees provided by such
systems, may exacerbate the impact on performance,
making them unsuitable for real-time applications.
Prior efforts on anonymous calling [8, 14, 23, 40]
unanimously agree with aforementioned shortcomings
of Tor. Some conclude this based on potentially biased
results [38], involving relays only in Europe or only con-
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ducted a few hundred calls [14], lacking diversity. Oth-
ers, such as Le Blond et al. [23], did not conduct any
study for measuring VoIP performance over Tor. Over-
all, we believe that existing literature does not quantify
the actual interplay of network performance attributes
(e.g. one-way delay (OWD), available bandwidth, etc.)
and how it impacts VoIP call quality over Tor. However,
the belief that Tor is not competent enough to transport
VoIP traffic is still prevalent [14].
Thus several novel VoIP architectures were pro-
posed [8, 14, 23] to tackle the shortcomings. Some of
these architectures, like Phonion [14] and Herd [23], re-
quire a new volunteer-run network along with millions of
active users (like Tor) for providing anonymity guaran-
tees. This requirement can be a major stumbling block.
Moreover, in the absence of active users and significant
cross-traffic, comparable to that of Tor (that transports
over 200 Gbit/s traffic per day [2]), one cannot adjudge
future anonymity and performance assurances of these
proposals.Most importantly, no such system is currently
functional.
Hence, in the absence of an existing anonymous
voice calling system, we chose to determine the root
cause(s) of poor performance over Tor. After ameliorat-
ing them, one may expect to achieve adequate voice call
quality with anonymity guarantees equivalent to that
provided by Tor. To that end, we began by conducting
a pilot study where we made VoIP calls over the Tor
network. We also captured the network performance at-
tributes, in order to eventually identify how they im-
pact voice call quality. Following ITU guidelines and
prior proposals [14], we used one-way delay (OWD) and
Perceptual Evaluation of Speech Quality (PESQ) [37] as
metrics to judge VoIP call quality. The PESQ ascribes
a value to judge the user-perceived audio quality in an
automated manner.
We made 1000 consecutive calls through individual
Tor circuits1, with the callee and caller machines under
our control. Contrary to the prevalent notion of poor
quality of calls via Tor, we observed good call quality,
with average PESQ ≈ 3.8 and average OWD ≈ 280 ms.
Overall, 85% of the calls were acceptable (PESQ >3 and
OWD <400 ms) as per ITU [16, 17].
In the absence of substantial evidence of poor qual-
ity calls, we went ahead and conducted an extensive lon-
gitudinal study involving 0.5 million voice calls over the
Tor network, spread across 12 months. These measure-
ments not only involved varied in-lab and real-world sce-
1 Using the standard Tor client utility.
narios with diverse Tor relays, VoIP applications, caller-
callee locations but also a user study. To our surprise,
even then more than 85% of voice calls had acceptable
quality.
The PESQ metric varies inversely with distortions
in the perceived audio. Packet drop and jitters, which
cause such distortions, are an artifact of increased cross-
traffic contentions. A high PESQ score, accompanied
with low overall OWD, in the majority of the cases thus
indicates low cross-traffic contentions, for VoIP calls.
Moreover, VoIP calls which are mostly transmitted at
low bit-rates (<120Kbps), incur less routing costs, and
thus may not suffer much distortions.
Other network performance metrics like available
bandwidth also varies with network cross-traffic volume.
Thus, concomitant available bandwidth during the call
(over 1Mbps in 90% cases2), along with data published
by Tor Metrics [2], confirms the reason for obtaining
good results.
Overall, this first ever long-term study involving ex-
tensive evaluations of voice calls over Tor, bore some
interesting results and insights. We summarize them as
follows:
1. In the vast majority of our experiments (>85%),
involving voice calls over individual Tor circuits,
we observed acceptable call quality, PESQ >3 and
OWD <400 ms. This holds for a diverse set of sce-
narios:
(a) Caller and callee spread across 7 countries (in
three continents).
(b) Coverage of a total of 6650 Tor relays, 22 times
more than previous studies [38].
(c) Popular VoIP apps such as Telegram and Skype.
(d) Both caller and/or callee using Tor circuits to
establish calls with one another.
(e) Different codecs and call duration.
(f) User study involving humans rating voice calls.
2. Acceptable performance in the vast majority of
cases was due to relatively low contention for VoIP
in most Tor relays.
2 Background and Related work
In this section, we begin by describing the basic con-
cepts behind VoIP calling and its evaluation metrics.
Next, we briefly describe Tor, followed by a discussion
2 The bandwidth was measured by iperf.
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on different types of anonymous calling scenarios. Fi-
nally, we describe related work in this domain.
2.1 Basic of VoIP
Voice over IP enables real-time voice communication
over IP networks. Any VoIP based system comprises
of two primary channels–one for control and signaling,
and the other for transporting the actual encoded voice
traffic. Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [39], is an ex-
ample of a popular VoIP signaling protocol. It includes
functionality like authenticating users, establishing and
terminating calls, etc. SIP along with Session Descrip-
tion Protocol (SDP) [13] allows negotiating call related
parameters like codecs. Once the call is set-up, Realtime
Transport Protocol (RTP) [41], a UDP based protocol,
solely manages voice traffic. It adds sequence numbers
to packets for in-order delivery, and buffers them to min-
imize the impact of jitter.
2.2 QoS Metrics For Voice Calling
The following metrics are often used for measuring the
quality of voice calls.
1. Perceptual Evaluation of Speech Quality:
PESQ [37] is the ITU specified and standardized
metric for voice call quality evaluation. It esti-
mates the user perceived call quality. PESQ com-
putation requires both the source and recorded au-
dio for comparison. The PESQ metric generates an
objective score using its own algorithm which is
then mapped to a subjective Mean Opinion Score
(MOS). It is demonstrated that the score generated
by PESQ highly correlates with the MOS score re-
ported by actual users. The metric largely reflects
distortions in recorded audio, which in-turn indi-
cates the impact of network losses and jitters.
It can assume values between 0 and 5, 5 being ex-
cellent, and 0 being poor and unusable. However,
in practice, values between 1 and 4.5 are observed
more often. Following ITU specifications, in our
tests, we considered calls with PESQ greater than
three as acceptable.
2. Jitter and Packet Loss: Jitter represents varia-
tions between subsequent packet arrivals. Such vari-
ations may arise due to packet reordering and losses.
While VoIP users can endure minor losses, jitter
may dramatically hamper the perceived call quality.
Even non-permissible variations in either of these
two metrics can sharply perturb PESQ, which re-
lies on both of these metrics.
3. One Way Delay (OWD): OWD is the time dura-
tion between when voice packets are encoded at the
sender and when they are successfully decoded at
the receiver. According to the ITU specification [16],
OWD should ideally be less than 150 ms. Further,
OWD below 400 ms is considered permissible for
international calls [17]. Hence, we chose the permis-
sible limit of 400 ms to evaluate the performance of
voice calls.
Interestingly PESQ score, other than losses, only cap-
tures the impacts of jitters, which represents variations
in OWD. It would suffer no perturbations if all the voice
packets were uniformly delayed, without jitter or losses.
However, for humans, such delays lead to time-shifted
audio, eventually leading to perceptive confusion. Thus,
in our evaluation study we considered both PESQ and
OWD as metrics for estimating call quality.
2.3 The Onion Router (Tor)
Tor [9], a widely-used low-latency anonymization net-
work, is built upon Chaum’s MIXes [7]. It allows it’s
users to communicate without revealing their IP ad-
dresses. It consists of globally distributed volunteered
hosts acting as relays. Clients communicate to servers
by proxying their traffic via a cascade of three such
relays, viz. the entry, the middle, and the exit nodes.
The client encrypts the traffic using a three-layered en-
cryption scheme, each corresponding to the three re-
lays, using keys negotiated with each of them, respec-
tively. These encrypted packets are then forwarded via
the three chosen relays. Each of these relays de-crypts
one layer of encryption and forwards it to the next one
in the cascade. Thus, no one ever, other than the client
itself, knows the IP address of all the relays and the
server. Each relay only knows about the previous and
next one in the cascade. The server only sees connections
arriving from the exit node, but knows nothing about
the client. By design Tor only supports TCP streams.
2.4 Types/Use Case Of anonymous
Calling
As already mentioned, anonymous calls are of great use
to whistleblowers, activists, undercover reporters etc.
However, one may ask the current alternatives (used by
such groups) to conduct anonymous calls. To the best
of our knowledge, there are no publicly available alter-
natives. This is the reason that in the past decade, prior
efforts [14, 23] attempted to design and build such sys-
tems. However, as discussed in Subsec. 2.5, none of these
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systems are functional. Moreover, they would require
the recruitment of a large number of volunteers to pro-
vide requisite anonymity guarantees similar to Tor [40].
Thus, it becomes of prime importance to analyze an
already available and actively maintained anonymity
project Tor, to test the feasibility of conducting voice
calls. However, there are secure messaging and end-to-
end encrypted communication apps such as Signal and
Telegram which are highly popular among privacy prac-
titioners. Though these provide security against eaves-
droppers, the centralized architecture of all such apps
allows the central server to know the details such as
who is calling to whom. Thus, even though such apps
provide secure calls, they may not be fit to be used for
anonymous calls.
We now describe the anonymous voice calling sce-
narios tested in our study.
1. Caller (one-way) anonymity: Here, the caller
wants to achieve anonymity (by hiding IP address)
against an adversary that may monitor and/or fil-
ter its traffic. Such scenarios represent journalists
and whistle-blowers who communicate sensitive in-
formation to other individuals or groups (e.g., news
headquarters), while evading the adversary.
2. Caller-Callee (two-way) anonymity: Here,
both parties want to achieve anonymity. Two in-
dividuals who both wish to communicate covertly,
while remaining anonymous to their respective ad-
versaries, may use such setups.
Further, these setups and their use cases are discussed
in detail in Sec. 4.
2.5 Prior Efforts
There exists scant literature on performance evalua-
tion of voice calls over Tor (ref Fig. 1). The only at-
tempts made were by Rizal et al. [38] and Heuser et
al. [14]. These involved instantiating a few hundred calls
through Tor for evaluating their quality.
However, the aforementioned efforts were limited in
scope. E.g., rather than using PESQ (an established call
quality metric), Rizal et al. relied only on network pa-
rameters like OWD, jitter, and packet loss as evalua-
tion criteria. Also, this study involved Tor relays only
in Europe (with only 298 out of the available 4453) for
their evaluation, and may not be representative of VoIP
performance, for the complete Tor network. Based on
these preliminary studies, prior efforts [8, 14, 23] pro-
posed novel architectures (ignoring Tor) for providing
anonymous voice calls. Next, we describe all such ef-
forts.
Inspired by Chaum’s mixes [7], Pfitzman et al. [31]
proposed ISDN mixes for anonymous voice communi-
cation. Authors proposed two simplex Mix channels,
one for the sender and the other for the recipient,
thereby enabling full-duplex anonymous communication
over the telephony network.
Drac [8] by Danezis et al. involves an architecture
for anonymous low latency voice communication using
social networks as relays to route traffic. The system,
while providing anonymity to a particular user, relies
on using the identity of other users in its social circle
as alibis. However, it was an analytical model with no
functional deployment.
Torphone [54], a system designed over Tor, was an
extension to send VoIP traffic via Tor. It reported hav-
ing achieved an OWD of 2–4 s, which is unsuitable for
acceptable call quality. However, it is presently non-
functional (and was last used on Windows XP).
In 2015, Le Blond et al. [23], proposed a novel ar-
chitecture, Herd, to prevent global passive/active ad-
versaries attempts to de-anonymize users, based on call
metadata (correlating start and end times of a call).
Herd relies on a set of dedicated mixes that relay VoIP
traffic to mixes and endpoints while hiding any distinct
traffic patterns. The mixes are also known as zones, and
a user can select available trustworthy zones to route its
call. They believed prior results on evaluating the per-
formance of VoIP over Tor (published back in 2008 [29]),
and concluded the RTT to be high (2–4 s), deeming Tor
unsuitable for VoIP. However, they refrained from con-
ducting a fresh study to gauge the (then) recent per-
formance of Tor. Additionally, they concluded that the
calling entities on Tor could be easily correlated, given
the start and end times of a call. They validated this
claim by analyzing the call records of a service provider.
However, obtaining such data for calls conducted via
Tor might not be easy, as Tor is a globally distributed
system, and it would require gathering data from ge-
ographically diverse ISPs. Moreover, they tested their
prototype on only four cloud hosts, performing just 12
calls, in the absence of active users and significant cross-
traffic when compared to Tor.
Phonion [14] is one of the recent anonymous VoIP
systems. It is fundamentally similar to Tor, but specifi-
cally developed for voice communication. It uses relays
(similar to Tor relay), relay services and broker system
(similar to Tor directory authorities). Phonion attempts
to anonymize call data records (CDRs) against different
adversaries. In Phonion, the calls are relayed via vari-
ous service providers. This prevents a single provider to
gather all the call records for a particular call. The ad-
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Fig. 1. Existing literature on anonymous voice calling highlighting their inconsistencies and incompleteness.
vantage of Phonion is that it works across different voice
calling technologies — VoIP, cellular or PSTN (public
switched telephone network). Additionally, it requires
Internet access only for an initial bootstrap phase af-
ter which, anonymous calls could be instantiated over
carrier services. However, the authors of Phonion also
side stepped using Tor. Through a pilot study of 100
calls, they concluded Tor to be unsuitable for transport-
ing VoIP calls. The study involved comparing one, two
and three-hop circuits of their prototype, with six-hop
Tor circuits (two-way anonymity). However, we show
in Sec. 4.2.1 and Sec. 4.2.2 that regular three-hop Tor
circuits provide suitable performance for VoIP. Usage of
this setup and performing 100 calls might have led them
to report an unacceptable average OWD of 777ms for
Tor circuits along with an average PESQ of about 2.4.
Moreover, the implementation of their system relied on
google voice, a service only available in N.America,
making the system unusable elsewhere. Lastly, it re-
quired the relay operator to pay an operational fee to
telcos, which might serve as a stumbling block for re-
cruiting relays.
Overall, a major hindrance in the wide-scale adop-
tion (and availability) of such systems, is the recruit-
ment of new volunteered relays and users (which Tor
already has in abundance). Schatz et al. [40] also high-
light this issue. Additionally, as previously mentioned,
prior evaluations over Tor, provide very few insights as
to how the interplay of network performance attributes
affects the voice call quality. Thus, in this paper, we
try to fill in these gaps by providing a comprehensive
picture of the call quality achieved when using Tor.
Comparison with prior VoIP measurements over
Tor: As already mentioned, only two studies actually
measured the performance of VoIP over Tor — Rizal’s
study [38] and Phonion [14] by Heuser et al. We now
explain how our measurement study is methodologically
different from them.
Rizal’s study: This study transported VoIP traffic over
Tor by tunnelling it via VPN tunnels. The experiments
conducted in this study, involved Tor relays hosted only
in Europe. Thus, Rizal reported a reasonably low aver-
age OWD of ≈ 152ms likely due to the geographic prox-
imity of relays. On the other hand, our study included
relays from all parts of the globe and hence provided
better coverage of the entire Tor network3. Thus, our
study measured an average OWD of ≈ 280ms likely due
to the diversity of involved Tor relays. Moreover, unlike
Rizal’s study, we used PESQ as an evaluation metric,
which is an industry standard for measuring user per-
ceived voice quality.
Phonion: It utilized the Mumble VoIP software [24]
to transport VoIP traffic via Tor. Authors of Phonion
used PESQ as an evaluation metric. However, their
study involved measuring performance only for two-
way anonymity, and not the one-way anonymity. On
the other hand, our study involved different scenarios
corresponding to both the cases viz. one-way and two-
way anonymity. Hence, we involved comparatively more
diverse and comprehensive set of measurement setups.
Additionally, both the previous studies involved
performing only a few hundred calls — 100 in Phonion
and 600 in Rizal. In contrast, we performed ≈ 0.5 mil-
lion calls involving a diverse set of geographic locations,
media codecs, etc., along with controlled experiments
involving private Tor setups.
Overall, these studies lacked the requisite compre-
hensiveness and a detailed analysis of different perfor-
mance attributes that could provide deeper insights for
VoIP performance over Tor. Thus, our study aimed to
fill this research gap by conducting an extensive study
3 This was achieved by using the standard Tor utility that
helped create different circuits based on default Tor circuit se-
lection algorithm.
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with an intent to better understand the behavior of
VoIP calls over Tor in varied setups and network condi-
tions.
Other Tor performance measurement studies :
There exist abundant studies which measure the Tor
networks’ performance in terms of observed bandwidth
and latency [10, 18–21, 25, 30, 43, 44, 55]. Few, like
Shadow [19] and Chutney [52], developed simulators to
analyze the performance of Tor. Others like Torflow [30],
EigenSpeed [43], and Peerflow [21] etc., focused on mea-
suring relay bandwidth for calculating relay weights by
either directly measuring relay bandwidth (Torflow) or
by indirectly inferring it using statistics such as relays
reporting the amount of data exchanged between them
(Peerflow). Measuring relay bandwidth is a crucial task
in Tor, as it is used to assign weights to different re-
lays that govern the selection probability of a relay in
a Tor circuit and thus the amount of traffic the relay
might serve. Cangialosi et al. [6] specifically focused on
measuring RTT between relay nodes. Tor metrics [51] is
another popular (and actively maintained) project that
periodically measures various performance attributes of
the Tor network e.g., circuit RTTs, bandwidth for down-
loading files of various sizes, etc. However, none of these
existing projects, measure the perceptual VoIP quality
and its associated network characteristics. In our study,
we primarily measure the VoIP performance over Tor,
along with network characteristics (like bandwidth and
RTT) of millions of Tor circuits. The metrics, such as
available bandwidth are essential in our study as they
help to infer the potential reasons for good or bad per-
formance while conducting VoIP calls. We often referred
to the Tor metric results to further support our claims.
3 Measurement Approach
In this section, we describe our experimental setups and
the approach taken for performing experiments to mea-
sure the quality of voice calls over Tor.
3.1 Experimental Setup
Previous efforts acknowledge that transporting VoIP
traffic anonymously over Tor is non-trivial, as VoIP gen-
erally uses UDP and Tor only supports TCP.
There are two ways in which one can succeed in
sending VoIP traffic over Tor. One way is to tunnel
UDP packets inside TCP flows. The other way is to
directly encode and send VoIP traffic in TCP packets.
Thus, some previous studies [38] utilized VPN tunnels
to encapsulate and transfer VoIP packets, while others
like Phonion [14], relied on Mumble [24] VoIP software
to generate TCP packets and transfer them directly to
Tor. Similar to these studies, we tested VoIP perfor-
mance using both the above approaches. These setups
are now described in detail below:
1. SIP client via VPN through Tor (V-Tor):
The V-Tor setup (ref. Fig. 2), involves a SIP client
(caller) connecting through a Tor circuit to a VPN
server for establishing a TCP tunnel. A step by step
walkthrough of this setup is described below:
Step1 The caller runs the VPN and Tor client util-
ities. VPN client is configured to establish a VPN
tunnel (to the VPN server) over a Tor circuit, by
forwarding VPN traffic to the Tor SOCKS inter-
face. This ensured that all the traffic from the caller
would reach the VPN server traversing the Tor net-
work.
Step2 Client would initiate a VoIP call using a SIP
utility. The VoIP traffic (generated from SIP) would
reach the VPN server via Tor (explained in step 1).
VPN server decapsulates SIP packets and forwards
them to the SIP server.
Step3 SIP server then helps negotiate the call be-
tween the caller and the callee.
2. Mumble with TCP mode over Tor (M-Tor):
This setup does not rely on a VPN. Instead, it relies
on using the Mumble client program (in TCP mode)
for encoding voice traffic through TCP streams.
These streams are transported via Tor to a Mum-
ble server that mediates the voice call between the
parties.
It must be noted that we performed experiments
for both the V-Tor and M-Tor setups. However, we ob-
tained similar results from both the setups. Thus, we
present description of V-Tor experiments in the main
body of the paper, and the details of M-Tor experiments
in Appendix B.
3.2 Overview of Experiments
We now describe the experiments performed to measure
the VoIP call quality over Tor. Our experiments were
primarily conducted to identify the root cause of the
hitherto believed poor voice call quality of Tor.
We began with a pilot study that involved conduct-
ing 1000 consecutive calls over Tor, with the caller and
callee under our control, but in different geo-locations.
Our results, using V-Tor (and M-Tor) setup, showed
high call quality in a large fraction of the cases. Consid-
ering these results to be potential outliers, compared
to findings of previous authors, we went ahead and
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T Tor HeadersV OpenVPN HeadersS SIP Headers + Voice Data
CALLER TOR RELAYS VPN & SIP SERVER CALLEE
Fig. 2. V-Tor: The caller establishes a VPN tunnel through
Tor, so that all the UDP VoIP traffic traverses the Tor net-
work. On reaching the VPN server, the traffic is sent to the
SIP server, which initiates a voice call to the callee.
M T M M M MT T T T T T T T M
T Tor HeadersM Mumble Voice Data
CALLER TOR RELAYS MUMBLE SERVER CALLEE
Fig. 3. M-Tor: The caller configures the mumble client to
work in TCP mode. Thereafter, mumble’s traffic is sent over
Tor eventually reaching the mumble server, which handles
the call procedure between the caller and callee.
conducted a comprehensive measurement study spread
across 12 months.
We conducted two different sets of experiments —
(1) involving in-lab setups and (2) involving circuits
through the public Tor relays.
In-lab experiments: In the in-lab setup, our goal was
to measure the performance of VoIP over V-Tor/M-Tor
setups with competing cross-traffic entirely under our
control. For this, we setup a private network in our
lab, consisting of Tor nodes along with client and server
(VPN, SIP, etc.) machines. This private network was
deployed on real machines, with three of them serving
as relays, while one of them was also serving as a di-
rectory authority. Other machines acted as clients and
servers. In these experiments, we measured performance
attributes and established baseline values (e.g., band-
width requirement) for a VoIP call. These experiments
were performed over setups involving different combina-
tions of VPN, Mumble, and Tor in the following manner:
1. Direct VoIP calls: VoIP calls between the caller and
callee were conducted without involving Tor and
VPN. The caller and callee communicated directly
using SIP or Mumble protocol. This helped us in
observing the minimum bandwidth and delay re-
quirements when no overhead was introduced (due
to Tor or VPN).
2. VoIP calls over VPN: Caller and callee communi-
cated using SIP protocol. However, calls were en-
capsulated through VPN connections, in order to
measure the impact (if any) due to the overhead of
running a VPN.
3. VoIP calls over Tor: Encapsulating the calls
through VPN connections (or Mumble) and then
transporting them via Tor circuits, to evaluate the
impact of the overheads due to Tor.
Moreover, we performed some additional experi-
ments to observe the impact of variation in background
cross-traffic on VoIP calls. We observed the variation
in performance when VoIP call(s) were made in the
presence of heterogeneous background traffic (e.g., other
VoIP calls and web traffic). Such in-lab experiments may
potentially present clues regarding the number of VoIP
clients that could be simultaneously supported by the
real Tor network.
Internet based experiments over public Tor: Af-
ter performing various in-lab tests, we carried out mul-
tiple experiments involving public Tor relays, where we
had no control over the background cross-traffic and net-
work conditions. These experiments involved measuring
performance across diverse scenarios (Tor relays, end-
points, codecs, etc.) with the intention of studying the
variation in performance under real-world conditions.
More specifically, the experiments involved measuring
the call quality by varying:
– Tor circuits: Involved measuring quality across a
large number of circuits (6650 unique relays) created
using the regular Tor client program.
– Geo-location of communication peers: In-
volved measuring quality by instantiating several
calls, varying the location of the communication
peers.
– Type of anonymity achieved: Involved measur-
ing quality while achieving one-way and two-way
anonymity, in accordance with the use cases already
described in Sec. 2.4.
– Circuit lengths: Involved measuring quality over
two-hop circuits. By default, Tor circuits are built
using three relays.
– Codecs: Involved measuring quality by varying the
the call codecs used.
– Call duration: Involved measuring quality when
call duration was varied.
– Type of relays used: Involved measuring quality
when using bridges instead of public Tor relays.
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We also measured the voice call quality for few pop-
ular voice calling apps such as Telegram [48] and Skype
[26], when used over Tor. Users may choose to rely on
using these already popular and familiar apps, instead
of having to setup V-Tor and M-Tor. Additionally, we
also conducted a user study involving 20 participants
who rated calls via Tor. Most of experimental results are
presented in the next section (Sec. 4). A small fraction,
addressing important concerns related to VoIP perfor-
mance, e.g., impact of call codecs, Tor bridges, etc. are
presented in Sec. 6.
3.3 Implementation Details
Host configurations: All machines of the in-lab ex-
periments used Intel Core i5 8th gen CPUs with 8 GB
of RAM. The hosts used in the experiments involving
public Tor relays were hosted on Digital Ocean’s cloud
based infrastructure, distributed across seven countries.
These machines were equipped with Intel Xeon 2.2 GHz
single core CPUs and had 2 GB RAM. Since the latter
experiments required initiating only a single call at a
time, we did not require machines with high-end config-
urations.
Tor configuration: In the basic configuration, all the
caller and callee hosts had the latest Tor v0.3.9 installed.
We used the Tor stem python library [53] so as to ensure
that only a single circuit was enabled at a time.
Communication Peers: For V-Tor experiments, the
end-point hosts were installed with OpenVPN [28]
v2.4.7. The VoIP traffic generated was encapsulated
through OpenVPN client and transported via Tor (by
specifying the SOCKS port in the OpenVPN configu-
ration). The clients used the python based SIP client,
pjsua [32], a command-line softphone, to automate SIP
calls. The module supported audio playout and record-
ing.
For M-Tor experiments, the end-point hosts were in-
stalled with Mumble client program, configured to work
in TCP mode. This enables directly sending voice traffic
over TCP streams. Further, like OpenVPN, the Mumble
client also allows transporting the voice traffic through
Tor, by specifying the SOCKS port in its configuration.
Torsocks [49] utility was used to transport iperf’s traf-
fic over Tor. Since torsocks does not allow programs
with root privileges, we relied on socat [11] tunnels for
transporting pings.
VPN/SIP Server: The V-Tor setup uses a machine
configured to be a VPN as well as a SIP server. Open-
VPN [28] v 2.4.7 was configured to work as the VPN
server. It forwarded the encapsulated SIP calls to the
SIP server. Freeswitch PBX [42] was used as the SIP
server for handling SIP calls. We used different config-
uration files that come with Freeswitch to make call
extensions, route calls, select codecs, etc.
Popular VoIP apps: Among all the popular apps,
Telegram is the only one that provides user APIs. Still,
we require to overcome several challenges to measure
the performance of Telegram calls over Tor.
Firstly, the API provides only instant messaging au-
tomation facility. We thus mined the source code and
discovered that it relies on libtgvoip [46] for making
voice calls. We used this library for automated calls.
Secondly, the library uses UDP for transporting VoIP.
We thus modified it to enforce transporting voice calls
via TCP streams. Thirdly, libtgvoip is configured, by
default, to play audio clips endlessly in a loop. We ap-
plied appropriate modifications to control the playout
duration, to suit our calls. Fourthly, we also required
modifying the library so as to synchronize the call setup
and termination events with starting and stopping of
voice recording. This synchronization is required for ac-
curately measuring PESQ. Additionally, pyrogram [47]
redirected Telegram traffic to the Tor SOCKS port.
Other popular voice calling apps like Skype poses
two challenges—viz., absence of resources like APIs or
source codes to aid call automation, and ability to
redirect traffic through Tor by configurable SOCKS
interface. To overcome the first obstacle we initially
synced the caller and callee machines. Thereafter once
the call was initiated, the caller plays out the audio
clip using mplayer [27], while the callee captured and
recorded the call audio directly from the sound card us-
ing pactl [33] utility. To overcome the second challenge,
we used OpenVPN to encapsulate and redirect Skype
call traffic to the Tor SOCKS interface.
4 Measurement Results
In this section, we describe the experiments conducted
to test the performance of anonymous calls over Tor,
and their corresponding outcomes. We begin by enlist-
ing some common steps we followed while conducting
the experiments:
– In all our experiments, a caller host played out an
audio clip containing 30 s of human speech. It was
encoded and transported, via a unique Tor circuit,
to the callee. The callee recorded the audio, which
is later used for computing PESQ.
– For every call, we recorded the network traffic
through pcap files, and also measured various net-
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work performance attributes of the Tor circuit
(through which the call is performed) like available
bandwidth and RTT using iperf and ping, respec-
tively. The ping test was performed during a call
as it is not a bandwidth intensive test. On the con-
trary, iperf (bandwidth intensive) tests were con-
ducted after the completion of the call, so that it
does not have any impact on the call quality.
For the in-lab experiments also, we measured the
stream bandwidth using iperf.
– PESQ score for every call was calculated by com-
paring the original (one played out at the caller)
and recorded (at the callee) audio clips. Any score
above three was considered good [16].
– One way delay was also calculated for the duration
of the call. We used ping to calculate OWD. As per
ITU guidelines for international calls [17], the upper
limit for OWD for acceptable voice call quality is
400 ms.
In every experiment, the above steps were repeated
for each call. Thereafter, we analyzed the measurements
and performance metrics across all these iterations.
4.1 In-Lab Experiments
We performed these experiments, with an intent of mea-
suring call performance under different testing condi-
tions, while fully controlling network link capabilities
and background cross-traffic. To establish the baselines,
we created three test scenarios for the V-Tor setup.
These involved: (1) Direct SIP calls (2) SIP calls over
VPN tunnel (3) SIP calls through VPN over Tor (V-
Tor).
All these experiments followed the setup described
in Fig. 2 For the scenarios where Tor was not used,
the nodes between caller and callee (in Fig. 2 ) merely
functioned as routers. This was done to minimize any
biases in performing experiments, by ensuring that the
packets traverse the same number of hops4.
Experiments using V-Tor setup:We started by ini-
tiating VoIP calls over all the three setups and computed
their respective PESQ scores and OWD values. The
capacity of the link between the caller and callee was
100Mbps. The measured PESQ score averaged across
100 individual samples was the same for all the three
scenarios i.e., 4.5. Whereas OWD was below 50 ms. This
4 Additionally, removing these hops do not have any observable
impact on our results. We kept them just to have uniformity
among our experiments.
result established that for a single call, with no compet-
ing cross-traffic, the overheads introduced by the VPN
and Tor had no significant impact on the call quality. We
additionally observed that the available bandwidth re-
quirement for a single call in all the three scenarios was
no more than 120 Kbps (ref. Tab. 1). As expected, direct
calls transmitted at the lowest rates. Additional over-
heads due to the headers introduced by VPN and Tor
progressively increased the bandwidth requirements.
Call category Bandwidth (Kbps)
Direct SIP call 84
SIP call via VPN ≈ 108
V-Tor ≈ 120
Table 1. Baseline bandwidth (in Kbps) requirement of VoIP in
different scenarios.
Next, to understand the impact of cross-traffic on
VoIP call quality, we initiated VoIP calls in the presence
of cross-traffic. The experiments were carried out for
three link bandwidth configuration—2 Mbps, 5 Mbps
and 10 Mbps. Studying the performance under cross-
traffic, for different link bandwidth would help us un-
derstand if the observed behavior is consistent or not.
These experiments were specifically conducted for the
VPN via Tor (V-Tor) setup. Further, these lab experi-
ments provided us insights on the number of calls that
could potentially be made under varied network condi-
tions on the real-Tor network.
Thus, we gradually introduced the cross-traffic by
increasing the number of parallel file downloads (using
wget) from another client that shared the link with the
caller. We made sure that the cross-traffic was in the
direction of call, to ensure adequate cross-traffic con-
tention. We measured the degradation in the call qual-
ity, by computing the average PESQ score, for every new
parallel connection introduced. Our findings are summa-
rized in Tab. 2.
Competing Link Available Bandwidth Call PESQ
Streams Bandwidth Per Stream Requirement Score
< 75 10 Mbits > 133 Kbps 120 Kbits > 4.2
80 10 Mbits 125 Kbits 120 Kbits ≈ 3.4 ↓
> 85 10 Mbits < 117 Kbits 120 Kbits < 2.3 ↓↓
Table 2. Analysis of V-Tor under the presence of competing non-
VoIP (web/file downloads) cross-traffic.
We then performed experiments, where the back-
ground cross-traffic constituted of other VoIP calls. The
cross-traffic was gradually increased such that it utilized
the total link capacity from 5%, to 10%, and then all the
way up to the point where the call under consideration
received < 120 Kbps of the total available bandwidth.
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At this point, we observed a sharp decline in PESQ
for the call (i.e., 2.3). This corresponds to unacceptable
call quality. Similar to the previous experiment, we per-
formed this test for three different link capacities (2, 5
and 10 Mbps) for the V-Tor setup. The results of the 5
Mbps link bandwidth test are summarized in Tab. 3. We
obtained similar behavior for the other two bandwidth
categories.
Competing Link Available Bandwidth Call PESQ
VoIP Calls Bandwidth Per Call Requirement Score
< 35 5 Mbits > 145 Kbps 120 Kbits > 4.2
40-43 5 Mbits 128 Kbits 120 Kbits ≈ 3.3 ↓
> 43 5 Mbits < 120 Kbits 120 Kbits < 2.3 ↓↓
Table 3. Analysis of V-Tor under the presence of competing VoIP
cross-traffic.
The results indicate that when the contention on the
shared link increases, the PESQ drops. The PESQ met-
ric is very sensitive to the impact of even minor network
drops or delays. Even a small increase in contention,
e.g. only five additional download streams reduce PESQ
from 4.2 to 3.4 (ref. Tab. 2). Corresponding to increased
contentions, the available bandwidth for every stream
(including VoIP) drops. The constant bit-rate voice traf-
fic of 120 Kbps suffers significant distortions that may,
however, have little impact on the non-VoIP flows. This
held when the cross-traffic was non-VoIP as well as when
it was VoIP.
These in-lab measurements indicate that, a client
should be able to conduct good quality calls, if the con-
structed circuit provides > 120 Kbps bandwidth. This
should hold true on the real Tor network as well. E.g., if
a circuit has an available bandwidth of about 1.2 Mbps,
then it is capable to simultaneously support a maximum
of 10 VoIP clients (with acceptable call quality).
4.2 Experiments involving public Tor
relays
Having obtained good performance in in-lab tests, we
went ahead to evaluate the performance of voice calls
over public Tor network. We expected the results to vary
significantly due to the dynamic nature of competing
cross-traffic and network conditions over the Internet.
We began with our pilot study that involved a client
host (caller), positioned in our university, establishing
VoIP call to a cloud hosted peer (callee). The call traf-
fic was transported via Tor. We sequentially started 100
calls, each transported via a different Tor circuit, and
measured the call quality by computing PESQ score.
To our surprise, for both the setups we observed an av-
erage PESQ of 3.8 and an acceptable OWD of 280 ms.
Even after 1000 calls, each transported via a freshly cre-
ated Tor circuit, we observed very similar performance
measures (PESQ ≈ 3.86 and OWD ≈ 273 ms).
However, one may argue that our positive results
might have been a small anomalous fraction. These may
have been different from the bulk of poor outcomes that
may have led others to deem Tor as unfit for VoIP. In
order to test that this was not a fluke, we conducted
a longitudinal experimental study covering diverse sce-
narios. The experiments are described below.
4.2.1 Caller anonymity: Co-located voice server and
callee (Scenario I)
We begin with the fundamental scenario where a caller
is positioned in a censored network and wishes to call
someone who is beyond the censor’s control. The caller
makes calls to the callee, through the public Tor net-
work, using setups similar to one shown in Fig. 2 and
3. It is assumed that callee runs a publicly accessible
VPN server (for V-Tor) on its host. This minimizes the
overhead from the callee side.
In our experiments, we chose seven individual cloud
machines as callers, and three other as callees. Each of
these was selected from Europe, N. America, and Asia.
For every caller–callee pair we made 1000 calls using the
V-Tor setup. In each case, we measured the PESQ and
OWD. A total of 42000 calls were made. The average
PESQ and OWD across all measurement was 3.88 and
217 ms, respectively.
By default, Tor circuits are three hops long. To re-
duce the potential impact of hop length on performance,
we repeated the said experiments by making calls over
two-hop circuits. This did not led to any significant im-
pact on the PESQ (3.90). However, as expected, the one-
way delay reduced to 205 ms. The CDF of PESQ scores
obtained for these experiments are shown in Fig. 4 5
Results clearly show PESQ >3 in over 93% of the calls.
4.2.2 Caller anonymity: separate VPN/voice server
(Scenario II)
There are, however, certain limitations of Scenario 1.
Firstly, the setup requires a publicly accessible VPN
server, which may be infeasible when the callee is behind
a NAT. Secondly, there may be cases where multiple
5 We show graphs for the experiments conducted via V-Tor
setup in the main paper. All the M-Tor setup results are moved
to Appendix B for reference. Also, the overall results do not vary
much.
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Fig. 4. V-Tor: CDF of PESQ for Caller Anonymity when server is
co-located with callee (Scenario I).
whistleblowers or covert reporters (i.e., several callers),
communicate to callees working for a common organiza-
tion. In such cases, having a commonly shared VPN/SIP
server, with high availability, supporting features like
voicemail, removes the need for the callee to be always
online. Thirdly, it reduces the hassle for every callee to
port VoIP server to different platforms.
Therefore we considered an alternative setup where
the VPN / SIP server and callee were not hosted on the
same host. They were distributed among seven different
cloud hosts, positioned across Europe, N. America and
Asia. This separation may incur higher OWD between
the communication peers, due to the intervening net-
work between the VPN/SIP server and the callee, thus
impacting call quality.
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Fig. 5. V-Tor: CDF of PESQ for Caller Anonymity when server is
separately hosted (Scenario II)
To test this, the caller made 1000 individual calls
(through Tor) to every callee (seven locations), via
VPN/SIP (or Murmur) servers (three locations). Sim-
ilar to the previous experiment, a total of 42000 calls
were conducted. We observed acceptable quality with
average PESQ 3.81 and average OWD 270 ms, slightly
higher than the previous scenario.
Here again, we tried to optimize the performance
using shorter 2-hop circuits. We saw the average PESQ
increase to 3.91, and the average OWD reduced to 210
ms. The results are presented in Fig. 5. A consolidated
CDF of OWD for V-Tor is depicted in Fig. 6. Evident
from the results, we observed PESQ >3 and OWD <400
ms in over 92% of the calls across both V-Tor and M-
Tor.
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Fig. 6. V-Tor: CDF of OWD variation for Caller Anonymity in
both Scenario I and II
4.2.3 Caller and Callee (two-way) anonymity
(Scenario III)
There may be cases where both the caller and callee
are positioned in censored networks. In such cases, they
may connect via Tor to a VPN/SIP server placed out-
side their respective censors’ jurisdictions. Their calls
would be routed via their individual Tor circuits. We
thus tried to observe the impact of such scenarios (traf-
fic traversing two circuits) on the overall call quality as
the additional network hops may increase OWD.
Similar to previous experiments, we varied the caller
and callee locations across seven countries, while the
VPN/SIP server was distributed across three. Each
caller initiated 1000 voice calls to a callee, resulting in
a total of 42000 calls. For V-Tor we observed an aver-
age PESQ of about 3.2 with 81% calls above PESQ 3.
However, the average OWD, as expected due to the in-
creased network hops, was about 458ms. This is slightly
above the acceptable limit.
We thus tried to optimize performance by using
shorter two-hop circuits. We hence repeated the above
tests using two-hop circuits and observed a reduction
of the average OWD to 396 ms. The results are shown
in Fig. 7. In general, for such scenarios, regular three-
hop circuits incur higher OWD, compared to two-hop
ones. Hence, two-hop circuits seem a better choice for
such cases. However, the results of our user study (ref
Sec. 4.4) shows that users did not have any noticeable
performance impact (due to the delay introduced) when
both the users conversed via Tor for two-way anonymity.
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Fig. 7. CDF of delay for V-Tor setup when two-way Anonymity
was achieved (Scenario III).
To summarize, in all the three scenarios over the
public Tor network we observed good call quality (PESQ
>3 and OWD <400 ms) in about 85% cases.
We use 400 ms as a threshold for good call qual-
ity following the ITU recommendation for international
calls [16]. However, these recommendations also re-
ported some user dissatisfaction even when OWD was
between 300ms and 400ms. On analyzing the results, we
found that more than 80% of calls had OWD < 300ms.
This has been further analyzed in detail in the Ap-
pendix. A.
4.2.4 Experiments involving popular apps
Next, we evaluate the performance of two popularly
used VoIP apps, Telegram, and Skype, when running
over Tor. Evaluating these apps would be beneficial
from the usability point of view as most users gener-
ally use these apps for their day to day tasks. Hence us-
ing them for anonymous calls would be relatively easy,
as they would not require installing V-Tor or M-Tor se-
tups. However, the users might not be completely secure
or anonymous, when using these apps (as discussed in
Sec. 6).
In this experiment, we instantiated 1000 consecutive
calls using each of these apps (for both the setups) and
computed their call quality. The average PESQ score
was 3.8 and 3.54 for Telegram and Skype, respectively.
Skype had more than 80% calls with PESQ score >3,
whereas Telegram had 85% > 3. Overall, there was not
much difference in terms of call quality between the two
applications.
In our results, we observe that popular voice calling
apps perform acceptably well over Tor.
4.3 Direct calls
In the previous subsections, we have established that
users would in the majority of the cases obtain good call
quality when calls are performed over Tor. However, it
would be interesting to compare the performance when
calls are instantiated with and without Tor to under-
stand the relative change in call quality.
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Fig. 8. Comparison of call quality in terms of PESQ obtained
with and without Tor.
Hence, we performed direct calls involving both the
setups. In the V-Tor setup, the calls were carried via
VPN, and for M-Tor they were carried out directly us-
ing mumble. We instantiated 1000 calls for each sce-
nario described in earlier subsections. The results are
shown in Fig. 8. As can be seen from the results, there
is an expected relative drop in performance when mov-
ing from non-Tor to Tor setups. This is obvious as there
are expected to be much fewer distortions on non-Tor se-
tups. However, the performance of calls via Tor is good
enough for the thresholds of performance metrics used
in our study (OWD <400ms and PESQ >3).
4.4 Users’ Perspective
In our research, we conducted an extensive experimen-
tal study to adjudge the quality of voice calls via Tor.
The study relied on two standard metrics i.e., PESQ
and OWD. These metrics are robust in judging the call
quality. In fact, PESQ was established as a substitute
for subjective tests (as already discussed in Sec. 2.2).
However, in all our experiments, we conducted calls
with a maximum duration of 30s. This is because, PESQ
does not support the evaluation of calls whose duration
is longer than 30s [35]. Moreover, the PESQ score eval-
uation is a non-linear function, with respect to call du-
ration. Hence, the mean of multiple samples of 30s will
not correspond to the PESQ of the actual combined du-
ration call, as clearly stated by ITU [35]. As per ITU
recommendations [35] and PESQ [37] draft, a duration
of 8s - 12s is sufficient to judge the call quality of the
channel under test. However, one might argue that the
real users’ experience might be different for calls > 30s
as these durations are not tested for. Therefore, we con-
ducted a user study that involved human subjects evalu-
ating the call quality (conducted via appropriate ethical
review committee’s approval, ref. A).
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The user study involved 20 participants6, which
were randomly divided into five groups of four par-
ticipants each. The groups were given individual sets
of calls, each containing three different recorded calls.
These calls were conducted over the Tor network, using
setups described in Subsection 3.1
The first call was 30s long, and the remaining were
two and four minutes long. We calculated PESQ for
the 30s call, and recorded OWD and jitter for longer
duration calls (as PESQ cannot be calculated for calls
longer than 30s). The users listened to these recorded
files and gave an Absolute Category Rating (ACR) 7 in
the range of 1-5. We then calculated the Mean Opinion
Score (MOS) by averaging the score given by all four
participants of each group (results of which are summa-
rized in Tab. 4). The users reported an average MOS
of 4.25, 4.5 and 4.0 for the 30s, 2mins, and 4mins calls,
respectively. These results show that, in general, users
reported good call quality over Tor.
Group MOS
No. 30s 2min 4min
I 4.5 4.5 4
II 4.5 4.25 4.5
III 3.5 4.75 4.25
IV 4.25 4.5 3
V 4.75 4.5 4.25
Table 4. MOS by different groups for varied call length.
Comparing MOS with network attributes: We
confirmed the aforementioned MOS values (obtained
from users) against recorded performance metrics. For
the 30s call, we compared the MOS values with the
corresponding PESQ scores. We observed an average
MOS of 4.25, and a correlated average PESQ of 4.2,
thus supporting our observations. Similarly, for the re-
maining two calls, we found that OWD and jitter were
well within bounds for “good quality” (OWD < 400ms
and jitter < 30ms). The average OWD was ≈278ms,
and jitter was about 24ms.
All the above experiments involved the users lis-
tening to recorded calls. Thereafter, we went a step
ahead, and asked ten users to converse daily via Tor
for usual conversations. It must be noted that both the
users connected via Tor, simulating Scenario III (two-
6 The location of participants does not have much effect as Tor
clients by default select relays in varied locations. However, our
participants were spread across three countries.
7 This is in accordance with ITU guidelines [34] for rating calls
in subjective tests.
way anonymity). Users reported a score for each of the
calls. Call length varied from 1min to a max of half an
hour. This experiment was conducted for about 15 days,
and users in the majority of the cases reported good call
quality comparable to that achieved via popular VoIP
applications rating an average MOS of 4.1.
The results in this user study further strengthen the
claim about obtaining adequate call quality for anony-
mous calls over Tor.
5 Insights from Measurements
We now present explanation of the aforementioned re-
sults, along with other interesting insights we observed
from these results.
5.1 Overall Performance Analysis
Computing PESQ involves the comparison of the origi-
nal audio clip, as played out by the caller, with what is
recorded at the callee. Effects of network delays, jitters,
and losses, reflected in the recorded audio, are captured
by this metric. Variations in network conditions, like in-
crease in contentious cross-traffic, leads to an increase
in the drops and delays, and thus negatively impacts
the perceived quality (and thus PESQ). Besides PESQ,
such contention also impacts other network performance
metrics like OWD, RTT and available bandwidth.
Our overwhelmingly positive results, with PESQ >3
and OWD<400ms in 85% cases are indicative of rela-
tively low network contentions that can impact VoIP
call quality. VoIP calls are encoded at low sending rates
(<120 Kbps) and thus require low available bandwidth.
Further, in ≈ 90.6% of our Tor circuits, we observed
adequate available bandwidth (> 1 Mbps), as reported
by iperf. About 95% of these 90.6% circuits supported
calls with acceptable performance. This indicates that
— circuits with sufficient available bandwidth improves
the chances of call obtaining good perceptual qual-
ity. This can be further understood by analyzing the
90.6% circuits where we obtained > 1 Mbps bandwidth.
Thus, we tabulate the frequency of these circuits, along
with their corresponding PESQ scores. As evident from
Tab. 5, for calls where we obtained good perceived qual-
ity (PESQ > 3), the frequency of > 1 Mbps bandwidth
circuits were also very high. Similarly, we also observed
that for bad quality calls PESQ < 3, the instances of
> 1 Mbps circuits were relatively low.
In general, we observe that with an increase in net-
work contentions, both call quality and available band-
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PESQ 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5
Frequency 6K 22K 162K 259K
Table 5. Variation of frequency of Tor circuits (>1Mbps band-
width) with PESQ of calls via them.
width decrease. This is evident from Fig 9. As incidences
of high PESQ coincide with cases when the recorded
available bandwidth is high, and vice versa.
Fig. 9. Fraction of PESQ scores at different available bandwidths.
Impact On Performance Over Time Additionally,
we also analyzed whether the performance of VoIP calls
changed over time. For this, we randomly sampled 100
calls from our measurements and analyzed the distribu-
tion of calls based on quality. We repeated this experi-
ment several times, and in each iteration, we observed
that > 85% calls always observed good perceived qual-
ity. This indicates that the overall distribution is uni-
form, and there was no observable change over time.
5.2 Performance Dependence on Types of
Relays
Fig. 10. PESQ of individual calls vs frequency of exit relays.
In this subsection, we analyzed whether different
type of relays (viz., Guard, Middle or Exit) along with
their frequencies have any observable impact on the
VoIP call quality over Tor. To begin with, we distributed
the relay frequency into three bins — low (< 10), mod-
erate (150 − 200) and high (> 500). Then, from each
group, we randomly selected a few entry, middle, and
exit relays (around ten each) and manually inspected
the PESQ scores of the calls involving them. For each
type of relays (in all frequency bins), we observed PESQ
scores ranging from 1–4.5, with the majority of them
being > 3. This strongly indicates that PESQ neither
depends on any specific type of relay, and nor on their
corresponding frequency of occurrence.
To further ascertain our claims and to obtain a com-
prehensive picture for all our measurements, we plot-
ted the distribution of PESQ scores corresponding to all
guard, middle, and exit nodes. The box plot for exit
nodes is shown in Fig. 10. As evident, the PESQ values
show no dependence on the frequency of occurrence of
Tor relays. Corresponding to both less (< 50) and more
frequently appearing relays (> 500) we observed PESQ
> 3 for a large fraction of calls. The trend was similar
for guard and middle relays.
Tor Churn Analysis :We now determine whether Tor
relay churn had any impact on our results. Tor relay
churn is defined as the rate of relays joining or leaving
the network from one consensus to the other (according
to Tor Metrics [51] andWinter et al. [56]). We calculated
the monthly relay churn8 for the entire duration of our
study (ref Fig. 11). It is evident from Fig. 11 that relay
churn was low (an avg. of ≈ 0.2%). Further, we also
observed that > 85% of our measured VoIP calls had
acceptable quality. Our overall results thus indicate that
such a low value of churn has an insignificant impact on
call quality.
Overall, the analysis in this subsection clearly indi-
cates that the performance was not dependent on any
specific type of relay. The apparent independence is be-
cause, for a call to be successful, we require less cross
traffic contention, and bandwidth of < 120Kbps for the
entire call duration. The prevalence of such an ecosys-
tem naturally on Tor has already been argued in Sec. 5.
8 The Tor consensus is updated every hour; in one month it is
updated around 720 times. The individual box plot corresponds
to the change in consensus of these 720 values. Thus, there are
12 box plots each corresponding to a different month.
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Fig. 11. Tor relay churn for the 12 months the study was per-
formed.
6 Discussion
In this section, we address concerns like how VoIP
performs over Tor when using bridges, using different
codecs, etc.
Call quality over Tor bridges: Tor bridges [50], are
unadvertised entry/guard relays, whose information is
closely guarded. They are conservatively distributed ei-
ther through BridgeDB [1], or covertly via out-of-band
means (e.g., emails). Censors may identify and filter Tor
traffic using entry node IP addresses and/or port num-
bers. User residing in such networks may use bridges to
access other Tor relays and set up the circuits.
Hence, to study the impact (if any) when using a
bridge, we performed 1000 measurements, using the V-
Tor setup, involving a new Tor circuit each time. The
average PESQ score was about 3.7. In about 85% calls,
we observed good performance (PESQ >3.0 and OWD
<400 ms). We restricted our measurements to a single
bridge node as bridges are scarce.
Impact of codecs: Codecs define the way audio is en-
coded / decoded and transmitted as packets. Hence we
measured the impact of different codecs on call qual-
ity. The calls for this experiment were conducted over
the real Tor network. We used some popular codecs
for our evaluation, viz. Opus, G.711, Speex, and GSM.
The codecs were selected with the help of configuration
changes in the Freeswitch SIP server. We conducted
1000 calls corresponding to each of these codecs and
measured their PESQ scores (ref. Fig. 12). We observed
that the fraction of calls with PESQ >3 were roughly
equal in all the cases. Thus any of the tested popular
codecs could have been used for initiating good qual-
ity calls. However, GSM and Speex are lossy codecs,
compared to lossless codecs like G.711, and thus may
not provide high-quality calls (PESQ >4) [15]. Besides,
such lossy codecs encode at lower bitrates compared to
the lossless ones 9. Thus, they may be used for Tor cir-
cuits with low available bandwidth to receive adequate
call quality.
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Fig. 12. CDF of PESQ scores when different codecs were used.
Thresholds for PESQ: The MOS scale proposed by
ITU delineates perceived performance using sharp in-
tegral differences. E.g., two corresponds to “annoying
but usable” and three corresponds to “fair”. However, it
does not extend such annotations for values in-between.
Further, upon listening to a few calls manually where
PESQ was between 2.8 and 3.2, we observed no audible
differences. Moreover, recent studies [22] indicate that
humans may be unable to differentiate the quality of
samples, when the difference between their MOS scores
is less than 0.4.
In our study, we conservatively selected a PESQ of
> 3 as “acceptable”, and anything below it as not (in
accordance with ITU). We also observed a significant
7% cases which maybe categorized as “annoying but
usable.” Finally, we also recorded about 8% with PESQ
under 2. ITU classifies these as “totally unacceptable.”
Thus, we believe that actual user experience may be
even better than what our study reports (as evident
from the conducted user study in Subsec. 4.4).
Selection of caller/callee endpoints: Throughout
our experiments, we used endpoints either as cloud hosts
or in-lab machines. All of these were sufficiently provi-
sioned for a voice call with more than adequate band-
width at the caller/callee end. However, one might argue
that our results might be biased as all our endpoints
9 GSM and Speex encode at bitrates <40Kbps whereas G.711
encodes at 84Kbps
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may have sufficient bandwidth for VoIP calls. But, in
general, the performance bottleneck was introduced at
the Tor relays. As already described in Sec. 5, there were
a significant number of Tor circuits which observed a low
bandwidth (< 1 Mbps). Hence, even if the endpoints are
well provisioned, it does not bias our results, as mostly
the Tor relays were the bottlenecks.
7 Conclusion
Real-time anonymous VoIP calls are of interest to pri-
vacy and anonymity conscious citizens, whistle-blowers,
and covert reporters, etc. However, existing research on
performance evaluation of VoIP calls over Tor is not
comprehensive. They contraindicate transporting VoIP
packets over Tor and thus favored novel architectures
to support anonymous calling. Moreover, there does not
exist a functional system to achieve the same. Addition-
ally, the costs involved in recruiting volunteer operated
relays (like Tor) along with users, and managing such a
system, might outweigh the benefits.
Thus, it was essential to identify the causes of poor
voice call quality over Tor by observing how the inter-
play of various network attributes (RTT, available band-
width, etc.) impacts VoIP quality. We hence conducted
a longitudinal study (spread across 12 months). It in-
volved extensive testing of about half a million voice
calls over Tor, including a user study and using vari-
ous Tor circuits, peer locations, popular apps, etc. To
our surprise, in over 85% cases, we observed acceptably
well performance (PESQ>3 and OWD <400ms), with
only under 8% cases which were totally unacceptable
(PESQ<2). The results of the user study also corrobo-
rate our findings. Our study is the first to demonstrate
that anonymous VoIP calls are indeed possible using
Tor.
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A Additional discussion points
VoIP apps with high bandwidth requirement:
Our measurements involved testing VoIP applications
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that encoded at low bit-rates (< 120Kbps). However,
these apps can be configured to encode at higher rates
(≈ 800 Kbps). We evaluated the performance at these
higher encoding rates (200 Kbps, 400 Kbps and 800
Kbps). We ran 1000 calls when the clients were con-
figured to encode at these rates.
As expected, an increase in the rates progressively
decreased the measured PESQ. Average PESQ scores
were 3.6, 3.2 and 3.0 for 200, 400, and 800 Kbps rates,
respectively. However, even at 800 Kbps, we measured
PESQ >3 for 65% of the cases. Thus even at higher
encoding rates, one can expect reasonable call quality.
Coverage of Tor relays: We recorded and analyzed
Tor circuit information for all our experiments. We now
present some interesting insights we observed from this
analysis. A total of about 600,000 Tor circuits were cre-
ated during our study.10 These circuits involved a to-
tal of 6650 unique Tor relays. Prior research (Rizal et
al. [38]) reportedly used only about 298 relays that too
restricted to Europe.
Human speech vs. recorded audio: In our study, we
used PESQ for evaluating perceived call quality. PESQ
is an objective evaluation metric and requires no hu-
man intervention to assess call quality. However, one
may argue that quality assessment through recorded
audio may not be representative of actual human ex-
periences. Moreover, the impact of speech artifacts like
the language used, intonation, pronunciation, and other
peculiarities may not be captured without human in-
tervention. Interestingly, PESQ is proven to be robust
against such artifacts [5, 36, 45].
Threshold of OWD: Fig. 13 shows the percentage of
calls which have OWD <50 ms, <100 ms so on till <400
ms. We notice that only about 10% of calls had a one-
way delay >300 ms and <400 ms indicating only a small
fraction of calls in that category. On the contrary, for
≈ 81% of calls, the OWD was <300 ms. This suggests
that in the majority of the cases, the user would obtain
satisfactory call quality with OWD <300 ms. Moreover,
in ≈ 28% of calls OWD was <150 ms, which is regarded
as an ideal quality call according to ITU. Thus, though
we considered the ITU recommendations of OWD <400
ms to judge call quality, for the majority of our calls,
we observed OWD <300 ms.
Ethical Considerations: As described in the paper,
we generated all our network traffic (i.e. the voice calls)
10 The number of Tor circuits are slightly higher than the total
number of experiments as the two way anonymity experiments
involve creating two Tor circuits for a single call.
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Fig. 13. Percentage of calls recorded at different OWD values.
using machines in our control. We did not capture or use
any third party’s data/network traffic. Moreover, as our
measurements were spread across a span of 12 months,
and involved generating low bit-rate voice traffic (≈ 120
Kbps), along with a short duration (<10s) single iperf
probes, we expect it to have had negligible to no impact
on any un-involved Internet users’ network performance.
Our user study involved human subjects in differ-
ent geographic locations who heard audio samples and
spoke to one another, via our setups. To the best of
our knowledge the audio sample bore no information
that may cause emotional or psychological trauma to
the subjects involved. The quality and the contents of
the clips were duly attested by the institutional research
review committee that involved subjects who were not
party to the research in any capacity. Further, we did
not record and (or) decode, either manually or electron-
ically, the speech between subjects, thereby preserving
their communication privacy.
B M-Tor Results
In this section, we describe the implementation details
along with the experiments performed using the M-Tor
setup. The client machine configuration along with how
Tor was setup remains the same for M-tor as well (de-
scribed in detail in Subsec. 3.3). The detail of the new
entity introduced in this setup is described below:
Mumble Server: The M-Tor setup had the Mumble
server (Murmur) v1.2.19 installed for handling voice
calls. A call channel was opened for every new call. The
caller and callee were configured to join this call channel
so that whenever a caller initiated a call, it would reach
the channel and the callee could record it for quality
evaluation.
Now, we describe the experiments involving the con-
trolled setups as well the ones performed over the public
The Road Not Taken: Re-thinking the Feasibility of Voice Calling Over Tor 19
Tor network. All these experiments followed the setups
similar to those of V-Tor.
B.1 Controlled Experiments
Similar to the V-Tor experiments, we performed two dif-
ferent sets of tests using M-Tor in the lab environment.
These involved: (1) Direct Mumble calls without Tor
(2) Mumble calls through Tor. We recorded an average
PESQ (measured across 100 individual calls) of 4.5 for
both direct calls and calls through Tor. Here also we ob-
served a slightly higher bandwidth requirement (70−80
Kbps) for calls that were transported via Tor, compared
to those that were not (50 − 60 Kbps). In general, the
bandwidth requirement for M-Tor was much lower in
comparison to V-Tor as the underlying codec used by
Mumble encodes at a lower rate.
Further, similar experiments were performed where
we increased the number of parallel connections grad-
ually, to see its impact on call quality. Here also we
observed a trend identical to V-Tor experiments.
B.2 Experiments over Public Tor
We considered the same three scenarios (as described
in Subsection. 4.2.1, Subsection. 4.2.2 and Subsec-
tion. 4.2.3) to perform experiments using M-Tor. The
CDF of PESQ scores obtained in Scenario I and Sce-
nario II are depicted in Fig. 14, and Fig. 15 respectively.
The average PESQ score obtained in Scenario III, was
3.8 with 85% calls above PESQ 3.
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Fig. 14. M-Tor: CDF of PESQ for Caller Anonymity when server
is co-located with callee (Scenario I).
The OWD results for both Scenario I and II (for
three hop as well as two hop circuits) are shown in
Fig. 16, with the results of Scenario III in Fig. 17. As
evident from the results, moving to two-hop circuits in
Scenario III (two-way anonymity) helped us improve
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Fig. 15. M-Tor: CDF of PESQ for Caller Anonymity when server
is separately hosted (Scenario II)
the OWD significantly with more than 90% calls below
400ms in comparison to 70%.
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Fig. 16. M-Tor: CDF of OWD variation for Caller anonymity in
both Scenario I and II
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Fig. 17. CDF of delay for M-Tor setup when two-way anonymity
was achieved (Scenario III).
Overall, similar to V-Tor, M-Tor proved to be ca-
pable of performing good quality calls for the majority
of the cases.
